solution is at the socially optimal level and independent of competition intensity. Thus, our analysis identi…es dynamic strategic interactions between competing …rms as an independent source of ine¢ ciency in quality provision.
In many industries, quality is a highly important aspect of the goods or services o¤ered, which in turn a¤ects the way …rms compete. If consumers make their purchasing decisions partly based on quality, a …rm can attract more consumers not only by lowering the price of its product, but also by increasing its quality. However, since a …rm's incentive for attracting more demand by providing higher quality is positively related to the price of the product o¤ered, price and quality decisions tend to interact in a way that makes the e¤ect of competition on quality generally ambiguous. It is therefore of theoretical interest to analyse which factors can potentially determine whether competition has a positive or negative impact on quality provision.
Whether competition stimulates or sti ‡es quality provision is also a question of great interest for policy makers, particularly in sectors like health care, long-term care, education and child care, where quality is a key issue. In these industries, prices tend to be regulated in some countries and unregulated in others. 1 There are several issues that are relevant for the question of whether prices should be regulated or not. One important issue is how free pricing will a¤ect quality provision, and whether competition along both dimensions (price and quality) will lead to a socially optimal quality provision or not.
In this paper we revisit the question of how competition a¤ects quality in a dynamic context, where quality provision requires investments and where quality is treated as a stock that can be increased over time only if the investment in quality is higher than its deterioration. This is a highly relevant feature of many dimensions of quality, since increased quality might require investments in new machinery and additional training of the …rm's workforce, for example. We take the dynamic aspect of quality provision into account by developing a model of price and quality competition within a Hotelling framework, where two horizontally di¤erentiated …rms choose prices and quality investments in each period of an in…nitely repeated game.
We use a di¤erential-game approach to derive the equilibrium price and quality provision. 2 1 See Brekke et al. (2014) for a more detailed discussion of price and quality competition in these sectors. 2 Price competition in oligopoly models, taking a di¤erential game approach, is studied in Vives (1985) , Qiu (1997) , Driskill and McCa¤erty (1989) , Colombo and Labrecciosa (2015) among many others.
Two di¤erent solution concepts are considered, corresponding to two di¤erent assumptions regarding the information set available to the players. As a benchmark for comparison, we …rst derive the open-loop solution, where players are assumed to know the initial state (i.e., the initial quality stocks of the …rms) but do not (or cannot) observe the evolution of states over time. This implies that each player has to decide its optimal dynamic plan at the beginning of the game and then sticks to it forever. We compare this benchmark with a closed-loop solution, where each player can observe the dynamic evolution of states and therefore react to changes in the quality stock of the competitor. More speci…cally, we derive the closed-loop feedback solution, where the players'decisions at each point in time depend on the current state (which summarises the entire history of the game). In contrast to the open-loop benchmark, the closed-loop solution is strongly time-consistent and implies dynamic strategic interaction between the players.
Our analysis produces three main results. First, steady-state quality in the closed-loop solution is increasing in the degree of competition, as measured by a reduction in transportation costs along the Hotelling line. This is in contrast to the open-loop solution, where steady-state quality does not depend on the degree of competition, as would be the case in an equivalent static game. Second, we …nd that steady-state quality is lower in the closed-loop than in the open-loop solution. The reason is that, in the former case, each …rm has an incentive to reduce current quality investments in order to dampen future price competition. This incentive is absent in the open-loop solution, where the players do not interact strategically over time. Third and …nally, we …nd that quality provision is socially optimal in the open-loop solution, which implies that the closed-loop solution is characterised by underprovision of quality in steady state.
The second and third of the above-mentioned results have an interesting parallel in the di¤erence between simultaneous-move and sequential-move versions of an equivalent one-shot game. In a standard symmetric one-shot spatial competition model with price and quality competition, equilibrium quality is at the socially optimal level if the …rms make quality and price decisions simultaneously, whereas a sequential-move version of the game -where the …rms can commit to quality choices before they set prices -yields lower, and therefore sub-optimal, quality provision in equilibrium. 3 The mechanism is similar to the one giving rise to di¤erent 3 Ma and Burgess (1993) derive this result in the context of a Hotelling model, while Economides (1993) derive 3 steady-state quality levels in the open-loop and closed-loop solutions of the dynamic model analysed in the present paper. Our analysis can therefore be seen as giving additional support to the sequential-move assumption in one-shot games. Even if price and quality choices are made simultaneously in each period of the game, dynamic strategic interaction (as in the closed-loop solution) will create the same type of incentives for underprovision of quality as in a one-shot game with sequential moves.
Our paper also contributes in a wider sense to the theoretical literature on the relationship between competition and quality. Theoretically, a higher degree of competition has two counteracting e¤ects on quality provision: (i) more competition increases the incentives to provide quality for given prices, but (ii) more competition also reduces the price-cost margin, which in turn reduces the incentives for quality provision. Using the transportation cost parameter as an inverse measure of competition intensity, standard spatial competition models produce a well-known 'neutrality' result, where the two aforementioned e¤ects exactly cancel each other out, and competition intensity has no e¤ect on equilibrium quality provision. 4 Brekke et al.
(2010) have shown that this neutrality result is broken in the presence of income e¤ects (where price changes a¤ect the marginal utility of consumers), which creates a positive relationship between competition intensity and quality provision. The present analysis identi…es another factor which breaks this netrality result, namely dynamic strategic interaction (as in the closed-loop solution).
The relationship between competition and quality is closely related to the question of whether an unregulated market will produce a socially optimal quality provision. Our analysis also contributes towards answering this question. In a seminal paper, Spence (1975) showed that a monopolist will provide a quality level that is higher (lower) than the socially optimal level if the marginal valuation of quality is higher (lower) for the marginal than for the average consumer.
In our model the demand system is linear, which implies that the marginal willingness-topay for quality is equal for the marginal and average consumer. In spite of this, steady-state quality provision is socially sub-optimal in the closed-loop solution. Thus, we show that dynamic the equivalent result in the context of a Salop model.strategic interaction between competing …rms creates an additional ine¢ ciency that leads to underprovision of quality.
Our work also relates to studies which employ a di¤erential-games approach. Piga (1998 Piga ( , 2000 analyses oligopolistic markets in which …rms set price and advertising levels. Advertising has some characteristics that are similar to quality, and can be interpreted as a tool to increase the perceived product quality. However, the way advertising is modelled in these two studies is distinctly di¤erent from the way quality competition is modelled in the present paper. Importantly, advertising is modelled as a public good that increases market size. In contrast, quality investments have a purely business-stealing e¤ect in our model. In Piga's models, the ranking of desirability of the outcomes depend on the information rule adopted (open-loop vs feedback). 5 Cellini et al. (2008) focus on persuasive advertising and compare the outcomes of price and quantity competition, and reach the conclusion that price competition entails more advertising. under the open-loop solution when the marginal cost of production is increasing. In contrast, the two solution concepts yield identical quality provision when the marginal cost of production is constant. In the current study we also …nd that quality is lower under the closed-loop solution.
Critically, this result is obtained under a constant marginal cost assumption and is due to the endogenous price (which is instead regulated in the previous study). 6 Siciliani et al. (2013) consider a model with motivated providers and sluggish demandwhich are sensible assumptions in markets in which quality competition is important and prices are regulated, like health care or education. In these models, the strategic nature of quality competition depends on the exact assumptions regarding production costs, with di¤erent implications concerning the private and social desirability of outcomes under di¤erent information 5 Like in the current study, Piga (1998) applies a Hotelling framework but, di¤erently, market size (and not quality) is the state variable, which evolves over time according the amount of advertising undertaken by the two …rms. In contrast, Piga (2000) presents a model with price as the state variable, in line with the assumption that prices are sticky. 6 An analogous result is obtained by Brekke et al. (2012) when demand is modelled as sluggish and quality can be changed instantaneously under a …xed price regime. Finally, investment in R&D which a¤ects the production cost or product characteristicsand has some parallels to investment in product quality -are studied by Hinloopen (2000 Hinloopen ( , 2003 and Lambertini (2005, 2009 ), among others. Intensity in R&D, and the incentive towards cooperative behaviour, depend on the form of market competition (price vs quantity competition) and the information structure, with a variety of possible outcomes. In general, more intense competition arises when the …rms'choice variable is price (rather than quantity), leading to higher consumer surplus in steady-state equilibrium (as is well known, even from 
Model
Consider a market with two …rms located at either end of the unit line S = [0; 1]. On this line segment there is a uniform distribution of consumers, with total mass normalised to 1. Assuming unit demand, the utility of a consumer who is located at x 2 S and buys from Firm i, located at z i 2 f0; 1g, is given by
where v is a positive parameter, q i and p i are the quality and price, respectively, of the good o¤ered by Firm i, k is a parameter measuring the marginal willingness to pay for quality, and is the marginal transportation cost.
Since the distance between …rms is equal to one, the consumer who is indi¤erent between …rm i and …rm j is located at x D i , implicitly given by
and explicitly given by
which is also the demand for Firm i, given the assumptions of (i) uniform consumer distribution (with mass 1), (ii) exogenous locations of providers, and (iii) full market coverage.
We assume that product quality changes over time, due to investment by …rms and depreciation. De…ne I(t) as the investment in quality at time t, and > 0 as the depreciation rate of the quality stock. Analytically, the law of motion of quality is given by
Each …rm has a cost function C ( ), which, at each point in time, depends on the quality investment, the quality stock, and output. For analytical tractability, the cost function is parameterised as follows:
where c > 0, > 0 and > 0. Thus, we assume constant marginal cost of production, and increasing and strictly convex costs of quality investments I i . We also assume that each …rm's costs are increasing and convex in the quality stock q i .
Assuming pro…t-maximising behaviour, the instantaneous objective function of Firm i is given by
and, de…ning as the (constant, positive) preference discount rate, the objective function of 7 Firm i over the in…nite time horizon is
In the following we model the behaviour of …rms, and …nd the corresponding equilibrium, In these models, it is usual to focus on the steady-state allocation, which can be interpreted 3 Open-loop solution Firm i's maximisation problem is given by
Let i (t) and j (t) be the current value co-state variables associated with the two state equations.
The current-value Hamiltonian is as follows, where time (t) is omitted to ease notation:
The solution satis…es the following conditions: (a)
More extensively, we have:
to be considered along with the transversality condition lim t!+1 e t i (t)q i (t) = 0:
The second order conditions are satis…ed if the Hamiltonian is concave in the control and state variables (Léonard and Van Long, 1992) . This is the case since (i)
In the steady state we have q i = 0, q i = q j = q OL and p i = p j = p OL , implying
which gives
and
It is straightforward to check that the steady state is locally stable in the saddle sense. 7 7 Indeed, suppose to evaluate the dynamic system around the steady state, under the symmetry assumption.
Firstly, note from (15) that p = 0, so that p(t) = p s OL and the dynamic system can be reduced to a two-variable system, in I and q. In matrix form this can be written as:
The results are intuitive. The steady-state price equates the sum of marginal production and transportation cost, the latter ( ) being a parameter inversely related to the degree of competition. This result is analogous to the Nash equilibrium of an equivalent static model. Steady-state investment and quality are also decreasing in the marginal cost of quality ( ) and investment ( ), and decreasing in the time preference discount rate ( ). Notice also that a higher depreciation rate of quality ( ) is associated with lower steady-state quality, while the e¤ect on investment can be non-monotonic and depends on the exact parameter con…guration. All else equal, stronger competition increases the elasticity of (…rm-speci…c) demand with respect to both price and quality, which leads to lower prices but has two counteracting e¤ects on quality provision: a positive direct e¤ect and an indirect negative e¤ect, since a lower price reduces the incentive to increase quality. In standard spatial competition models, in a static setting, these two e¤ects exactly cancel each other, implying that competition intensity does not a¤ect equilibrium quality provision. 8 where the optimal investment plan is decided once and for all at the outset of the game.
0 Clearly, the Jacobian matrix of such a dynamic system has a negative determinant, ( + ) = ; and a positive trace, ; this means that the steady state is a saddle point. The dynamic properties are the same as in . 8 See, e.g., Ma and Burgess (1993) for the case of Hotelling competition and Gravelle (1999) for the case of Salop competition.
4 Closed-loop solution
In this section we present the closed-loop solution, where each …rm knows not only the initial state of the system, but can also observe (and therefore react to) the quality stock of the competing …rm in all subsequent periods. More speci…cally, we present the closed-loop feedback solution, where the players -at each point in time -make decisions by taking into account the current value of states (which summarises the entire past history of the game). While the closedloop feedback solution is strongly time-consistent, and therefore arguably a more appealing solution concept in a context of dynamic competition, this solution is also considerably more complicated to calculate. In this section we therefore present directly the optimal dynamic decision rules in the closed-loop feedback solution and relegate the derivation of these rules to the Appendix.
If the parameters and/or are su¢ ciently large relative to k, which we will henceforth assume is the case, there is a unique globally asymptotically stable closed-loop solution. The optimal pricing rule for Firm i in this solution is given by
At each point in time, there is a positive relationship between the quality stock and the price charged by each …rm. All else equal, higher quality implies higher demand, which makes demand less price elastic and therefore increases the pro…t-maximising price. Obviously, an increase in the competitor's quality level has the opposite e¤ect. Since the two …rms optimal pricing rules are symmetric, it follows that
Thus, at each point in time, the …rm with higher quality charges a higher price.
The optimal quality investment rule for Firm i in the closed-loop solution is 
and where y := 6 s 2 + , s := + 1 2 and g := k 2 . The negative sign of 3 is assumed to ensure global asymptotic stability. For the solution to be real, we must also assume that y 2g.
Finally, given that 3 < 0, the slightly stricter condition y 8 3 g is su¢ cient to ensure that the solution is unique. In qualitative terms, the conditions 3 < 0 and y The key property of the quality investment rule given by (27), is the negative sign of 5 , which implies that quality investments are intertemporal strategic substitutes 9 ; the higher the quality stock of a given …rm, the lower the optimal investment level of the competing …rm. The intuition for this property is related to the interaction between price and quality investment choices. All else equal, an increase in the quality stock of Firm j leads to reduced demand for Firm i, and this …rm will therefore optimally reduce its price, as shown by (25) . However, this price reduction implies a lower price-cost margin for Firm i, which in turn implies a reduction in the marginal pro…t gain of attracting more demand by increasing quality. Firm i will therefore respond by reducing its quality investments. 10 
Steady state
In steady state, where q i = q j , equilibrium prices in the closed-loop solution are given by p CL = c + (31) 9 As de…ned by Jun and Vives (2004) , intertemporal strategic substitutability implies that the control of each player responds negatively to the state of the other player.
1 0 In a static model of price and qualiy competition, Brekke et al. (2015) show that the strategic substitutability of quality choices holds for more general demand functions, and also holds for the case of variable (outputdependent) quality costs, as long as the e¤ect of higher quality on marginal production costs is not too strong.
and are therefore equal to the steady-state prices in the open-loop solution (and to the equilibrium prices in an equivalent static game).
Steady-state quality in the closed-loop solution is implicitly given by the steady-state condition I i = q i , and explicitly given by
In addition to 3 < 0, global asymptotic stability also requires 3 + 5 < 0 and 3 5 < 0.
Notice that, since 5 < 0, the condition 3 < 0 ensures that
How does steady-state quality under feedback rules depend on the degree of competition (inversely measured by )? Since 3 + 5 does not depend on , it is relatively straightforward to see that
Thus:
Proposition 2 When …rms adopt feedback (closed-loop) decision rules, steady-state quality is increasing in the degree of competition.
As previously explained, lower transportation costs have two counteracting e¤ects on the …rms'incentives to invest in quality. For given prices, lower transportation costs make demand more quality elastic, which increases the pro…t-gain of quality investments. On the other hand, lower transportation costs also make demand more price elastic, leading to lower prices, which in turn dampens incentives for quality investments. This result is perhaps somewhat surprising. Although higher competition intensity leads to higher steady-state quality levels in the closed-loop solution, as shown in Proposition 2, quality provision is nevertheless always lower in the arguably more 'competitive'strategic environment -when the players use (closed-loop) feedback rules -than in the open-loop setting.
The intuition behind this result is related to how current quality investments a¤ect future price competition. Suppose that, at time t, Firm i has a higher quality level than Firm j (i.e., q i (t) > q j (t)). The optimal pricing rule, given by (25) , then dictates that Firm j should 'compensate'for the lower quality stock by setting a lower price than Firm i. In other words, higher quality investments by one …rm today will trigger stronger price competition from the other …rm in the future, which -all else equal -dampens the incentives for quality investments.
Thus, when the …rms use feedback decision rules and can, at each point in time, adjust their investment and price decisions according to the evolution of states, each …rm has a strategic incentive to reduce its quality investments in order to dampen future price competition from the rival …rm. 11 This is in contrast to the open-loop solution, where there is no strategic interaction over time, and where the above-mentioned strategic e¤ect is not present. This explains why steady-state quality is lower in the closed-loop solution than in the open-loop solution.
The result in Proposition 3 and the intuition behind it has a striking parallel in the di¤erence between simultaneous and sequential decisions in a one-shot version of the game. As shown by Ma and Burgess (1993) , equilibrium quality is lower when quality and price decisions are made sequentially rather than simultaneously, and the reason is precisely the strategic incentive to lower quality in order to dampen price competition when quality decisions are made before prices are set. 12 This suggests that, in the case at hand, simultaneous-move and sequentialmove games in a static setting provide results which are reasonable parallels of the open-loop and the closed-loop solutions, respectively, in a dynamic setting.
Welfare
We de…ne social welfare as the discounted present value of the sum of aggregate consumer surplus and pro…ts accruing over the in…nite time horizon. Since total demand is …xed, this is equivalent to aggregate gross consumer utility minus the total costs of production, transportation and quality provision. 13 We derive the …rst-best optimal solution by letting the social planner choose the quality investment and market share for each …rm, in order to maximise social welfare.
Formally, this problem is given by
which simpli…es to
subject to (36)-(39).
Let i (t) and j (t) be the current value co-state variables associated with the two state equations. The current-value Hamiltonian is:
The solution is given by (a)
In the symmetric steady state we have: However, a relevant di¤erence occurs between the steady-state quality in the closed-loop solution and the equilibrium quality in the sequential-move one-shot game. Indeed, the quality in the closed-loop dynamic game depends on transportation cost, while equilibrium quality in the sequential-move game does not. Put di¤erently, the 'neutrality' result obtained by static games, according to which lower transportation cost (and hence …ercer competition) has no e¤ect on quality, no longer holds if we consider dynamic competition.
Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the behaviour of oligopolistic …rms, when they can choose the price and the quality of their products. Quality competition in oligopolistic markets is the object of a large body of theoretical and applied literature. The novelty of the present analysis rests on two facts: …rstly, we have made the price endogenous, while most available models generally consider prices as regulated when quality is the choice variable (see, e.g., Siciliani et al., 2013) . Second, we have taken a di¤erential-game approach, which allows us to highlight how price and quality choices interact when …rms make their decisions in a dynamic framework. More speci…cally, we have presented a di¤erential-game model, under di¤erent assumptions concerning the information set used by …rms over time, namely, the open-loop rule and the feedback closedloop rule. The properties of the equilibria generated under these two assumptions are studied and compared with the conclusions provided by static models of price and quality competition (e.g., Ma and Burgess, 1993) .
Our model highlights the e¤ect of current quality on rivals'future price decisions, which is shown to play a crucial role in …rms'decision making. In particular, steady-state quality emerges to be socially sub-optimal if the closed-loop information rule is used by the competing …rms.
This is due to the interaction between price and quality in a dynamic setting. Thus, we show that dynamic strategic interaction between competing …rms creates an additional ine¢ ciency that leads to underprovision of quality. We have also shown that the steady-state quality in the closed-loop solution is increasing in the degree of competition, as measured by a reduction in transportation costs. This is in contrast to the outcome from an equivalent static game and from the open-loop solution, where the equilibrium quality does not depend on the degree of competition.
In sum, the dynamic approach allows us to uncover relevant and non-trivial e¤ects, both from a positive and a normative point of view. Since quality is generally non-veri…able and thus hard to regulate, and since the under-provision result is caused by dynamic interaction between price and quality choices, our analysis suggests a potential role for price regulation as an instrument that can be used to avoid an ine¢ cient outcome with respect to quality provision.
Our analysis also shows that such a policy intervention might be unnecessary if …rms instead are committed to long-term plans regarding quality investments (in which case the relevant solution concept is open-loop). The consideration of time, hence, simply represents an additional source of evaluation in the never-ending debate about the necessity and desirability of public intervention in market economies.
Derivation of the closed-loop solution
The …rm's instantaneous objective function is
which -faced with the linear dynamic constraint -gives rise to a linear-quadratic problem.
Hence, we de…ne the value function as
De…ne I i = i (q i ; q j ) and I j = j (q i ; q j ). The value function has to satisfy the Hamilton-JacobiBellman (HJB) equation:
(p i c)
Maximisation of the right-hand-side with respect to I i yields V i q i = I i , which after substitution
Similarly, we obtain
Maximisation of the right-hand-side with respect to p i and p j yields
23 from which we obtain the simple expression:
into the HJB equation, we obtain
and, after substitution of V i , we obtain For the equality to hold, the terms in brackets in the above equation have to be equal to zero.
Notice that the last three terms do not depend on 0 , 1 and 2 , but only on 3 , 4 and 5 .
We therefore focus on the following system of three equations in three unknowns ( 3 , 4 and . We can re-write the system more succinctly as: 
A necessary condition for 3 5 < 0 is therefore 6y 7g 81 4 C = 3y 4g + 6 p 3B > 0;
which holds for all y > 2g. It is straightforward to show that the second term in (A21) is monotonically increasing in y and decreasing in g (for y > 2g). Since y is monotonically increasing in and g is monotonically decreasing in k and , and since the …rst term in (A21) does not depend on either of these parameters, if follows that (S3) satis…es the conditions for global asymptotic stability if and/or are su¢ ciently large relative to k. In qualitative terms, this condition ( and/or su¢ ciently large relative to k) also ensures y > 8 3 g, which implies that (S3) is the unique globally asymptotically stable closed-loop solution.
In the steady state closed-loop solution we have 
From (S3), note that 4 = 5 . We can therefore re-write 1 as 1 = k ( 3 + 5 ( + ) ) 3 (( ( + ) ((2 3 + 5 ) ( + ) ))
so that
3 ) ( 
which always holds. Since q OL is independent of while q CL is monotonically decreasing in , it follows that q OL > q CL for all g y 2 .
Q.E.D.
